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TITLE VII IN ACADEMIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE JUDICIAL POLICY OF DEFERENCE
In 1972 Congress extended coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19641 to the faculty employment decisions of colleges and univer-
sities.2 In the ensuing years courts were reluctant to apply Title VII to
tenure discrimination cases.3 Courts deferred to administration deci-
sions, relying on the numerous, highly subjective factors underlying aca-
demic tenure decisions.4 Courts considered the peer-review tenure
decision process used by academic institutions worthy of protection.5
The refusal of most courts to intrude upon the tenure decision process
has imposed on academicians a much heavier burden of proof than that
carried by other Title VII plaintiffs.6
Part I of this Note examines the test established by the Supreme Court
for proving discriminatory treatment under Title VII. Part II discusses
the judicial response to Title VII cases challenging a tenure process. This
part focuses on courts' deferential treatment of peer judgments of qualifi-
cations for tenure. In addition, this part examines the judicial reluctance
to compel discovery of confidential tenure review documents. Part III
proposes an analytical framework and a discovery method that will facil-
itate judicial review of the problems created by the unique nature of ten-
ure decisions.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)) [hereinafter Title VII].
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 removed the exemption for academicians.
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 3, 86 Stat. 103, 103-04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982)). Congress
intended that the statute cover discrimination in academia. A House Report states:
There is nothing in the legislative background of Title VII nor does any national policy
suggest itself to support the exemption of these educational institution employees-primar-
ily teachers-from Title VII coverage. Discrimination against minorities and women in
the field of education is as pervasive as discrimination in any other field of employment....
The committee feels that discrimination in educational institutions is especially critical.
The committee can not imagine a more sensitive area than educational institutions where
the Nation's youth are exposed to a multitude of ideas that will strongly influence their
future [sic] development.
See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2137, 2156.
3. See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. See generally SELDIN, CHANGING PRAC-
TICES IN FACULTY EVALUATION (1984); SHAW, ACADEMIC TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDU-
CATION (1971).
5. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 26-47.
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I. TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,7 the Supreme Court articulated
a test for Title VII disparate treatment claims. First, the plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination.8 If the plaintiff
satisfies this requirement, then the burden shifts to the defendant to artic-
ulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment deci-
sion.9 If the defendant meets this burden, then the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's articulated justification is a pretext for discrimina-
tion.'0 Thus, the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against her.'
The Supreme Court refined the McDonnell Douglas test in Texas Dept.
of Community Affairs v. Burdine.'2 In Burdine, the Court held that once
the plaintiff established a prima facie case, the defendant need only pres-
ent evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact about the alleged
discrimination against the plaintiff.'" The Court required the defendant
merely to clarify the factual issue for the plaintiff and provide the plain-
tiff with a full and fair opportunity to prove pretext. 14
The plaintiff in Burdine argued that the defendant must prove by a
7. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8. Id. at 802. The Court stated that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons with equal or less qualifications. Id.
The Supreme Court in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), stated:
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's
evidence, and if the employer is silent in the fact of the presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case.
Id. at 254.
9. 411 U.S. at 802. The Supreme Court clarified this requirement in Board of Trustees of
Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978). The Court refuted the plaintiff's argument that
McDonnell Douglas required the defendant to prove an absence of discriminatory motive. The Court
held that "articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" will suffice to meet the em-
ployer's burden of proof. Id. at 24-25. The Court failed, however, to resolve completely the issue of
the defendant's burden. See infra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
10. 411 U.S. at 804.
11. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 255. The defendant's evidence must raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it
discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. at 254-55. If the defendant carries this burden of production,
the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted. Id. at 255.
14. Id. at 255-56. The Court held that the defendant need not prove that the person hired was
more qualified than the plaintiff. Title VII does not require an employer to hire the minority or
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preponderance of the evidence that nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment decision existed. The Supreme Court, however, pointed to
three reasons for the lesser burden of proof.15 First, the sole purpose of
the articulation requirement was to clarify the issues before the plaintiff
proved pretext. 16 Second, although the defendant did not have a formal
burden of persuasion, the defendant retained incentive to persuade the
trier of fact. 7 Third, liberal discovery rules and easy access to Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) files would help the
plaintiff sustain her burden of proof.18
II. THE JUDICIAL POLICY OF DEFERENCE
A. The Subjective Nature of Tenure Decisions
At the college level, tenure decisions, rather than initial hiring deci-
sions, are crucial. A grant of tenure is typically a lifetime appointment.
The decision has far-reaching implications for both the university and
the recipient. 9 Accordingly, universities carefully evaluate the qualifica-
tions of candidates seeking tenured faculty appointments, applying stan-
dards influenced by diverse factors.20
At the threshold of the process, a tenure candidate must meet certain
objective criteria such as employment with the university for a prescribed
length of time and possession of the requisite academic degrees. 2 1 Once a
candidate fulfills these requirements, a peer-review committee evaluates
the candidate's performance in three areas: scholarship, teaching ability,
and collegiality. 22  Standards for each area may depend on the depart-
female applicant whenever her qualifications are equal to those of a white or male applicant. Id. at
259.
15. See id. at 258.
16. Id. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff needs a clear articulation in order to have a full
and fair opportunity to prove pretext. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See SHAW, supra note 4, at 17-20.
20. Id. Such factors include the institution's ability to attract faculty, the needs of the particu-
lar department, and the individual's academic achievements. See id. To complicate matters, the
decisions applying these factors are highly decentralized. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell University,
729 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1984).
21. SHAW, supra note 4, at 34-42.
22. See SELDIN, supra note 4, at 35-74. Numerous factors influence the evaluation of the over-
all performance of a candidate: classroom teaching, supervision of graduate study, supervision of
honors programs, research, publication, public service, consultation, government and business, activ-
ity in professional societies, student advising, campus committee work, length of service in rank,
competing job offers, and personal attributes. Id. at 36.
Number 2]
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ment, the financial condition of the institution, or a need to improve the
departmental or institutional academic standing.23
The highly subjective nature of academic tenure decisions deters most
courts from second-guessing peer-review committee decisions on matters
of tenure.24 Judicial deference here significantly alters the application of
the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine discrimination test discussed above.
This test requires that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination, the defendant must articulate legitimate reasons for its
tenure decision.25 The courts' refusal to scrutinize tenure decisions pre-
cludes plaintiffs from proving pretext, and thus discrimination, absent
evidence of procedural irregularities, arbitrary or biased tenure criteria,
or a discriminatory motive.
Faro v. New York University26 exemplifies the policy of judicial defer-
ence in Title VII tenure discrimination cases. In Faro, the plaintiff
brought suit alleging unlawful sex-based discrimination when the Uni-
versity terminated her employment after a research grant expired.27 The
Second Circuit denied relief, stating that the courts are ill-suited for su-
pervising education and faculty appointments at the university level. 28
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, has
23. See Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984); see also SELDIN, supra
note 4, at 1-14.
24. See infra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
26. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
27. Id. at 1231. The University claimed that no tenure-track appointments were available due
to the University's financial malaise.
28. Id. at 1231-32. But see Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1978) (criticizing
Faro). The Powell court stated:
This anti-interventionist policy has rendered colleges and universities virtually immune to
charges of employment bias, at least when that bias is not expressed overtly. We fear,
however, that the common-sense position we took in Faro, namely that courts must be
ever-mindful of relative institutional competencies, has been pressed beyond all reasonable
limits, and may be employed to undercut the explicit legislative intent of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In affirming here, we do not rely on any such policy of self-abnegation where
colleges are concerned.
Id. at 1153.
Similarly, in Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1263 (M.D. Pa. 1976), a tenure
candidate alleged that the University impermissibly based its tenure decision on the candidate's exer-
cise of first amendment rights. Id. at 1267. The court stated that it was powerless to substitute its
judgment for that of the University. The court reasoned that courts do not possess the expertise to
evaluate academic performance. Id. at 1270. The court stated, "courts will not serve as a Super-
Tenure Review Committee." Id.; see also Green v. Board of Regents, 474 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1973);
Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Peters v. Middlebury
College, 409 F. Supp. 857 (D. Vt. 1976).
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recognized the heavy burden imposed on plaintiffs by a policy of defer-
ence. In Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College,29 the court
noted that the sophistication of participants in tenure decisions made it
difficult for plaintiffs to obtain direct evidence of discrimination. The
court found that unsubstantiated reasons for denial of promotion, a dis-
criminatory atmosphere, and stricter criteria for female candidates than
for male candidates permitted an inference of sex discrimination.30
Thus, plaintiffs may rely on indirect proof of discriminatory motives.31
In Zahorik v. Cornell University32 the Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the university. Although
recognizing the onerous burden placed on plaintiffs alleging discrimina-
tion in tenure decisionmaking,33 the court declined to review the merits
of the University's decision because of the unique nature of tenure deci-
sions and judicial inability to determine the level of achievement required
for tenure.3 4
The Seventh Circuit, in Namenwirth v. Board of Regents of the Univer-
29. 569 F.2d 169, 175 (1st Cir.) (Sweeney 1), vacated and remanded per curiam, 439 U.S. 24
(1978), afY'd, 604 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1979) (Sweeney I1), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980). The
Sweeney I court disapproved of the "hands off" attitude adopted by other courts. The court stated:
[W]e caution against permitting judicial abdication of a responsibility entrusted to the
courts by Congress. That responsibility is simply to provide a forum for the-litigation of
complaints of sex discrimination in institutions of higher learning as readily as for other
Title VII suits.
569 F.2d at 176.
30. 604 F.2d at 112-13. Cf Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981)
(discussed infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d
1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussed infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text); Kunda v. Muhlenberg
College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussed infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text).
31. See supra note 30.
32. 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984). The plaintiff alleged a procedural irregularity, claiming that the
department chairman maintained an indifferent attitude toward Zahorik's candidacy and abstained
from serving on the tenure committee. Zahorik also contended that the committee advocated the
candidacy of a male candidate but failed to do the same for her. Id. at 89. Further, the plaintiff
demonstrated that an abstaining member of the department wrote that Zahorik had a problem in
attracting graduate students because she was "too feminine" in that she was unassuming, unaggres-
sive, and noncompetitive. Id. at 89-90.
33. Id. at 93. The court cited the potential for concealment of discrimination, and further
noted that evidence of comparisons which might tend to show discrimination is scarce. Id.
34. Id. at 92-93. In Zahorik, the threshold issue was the sufficiency of the plaintiff's tenure
qualifications. The Zahorik court held that a plaintiff is qualified for tenure when "some significant
portion of the departmental faculty, referrants, or other scholars in the particular field hold a
favorable view on the question." Id. at 94. Compare Banerjee v. Board of Trustees of Smith College,
648 F.2d at 61, 62 (1st Cir.) (holding that plaintiffneed only show that her qualifications brought her
among those from whom the university would make a discretionary selection), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
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sity of Wisconsin System,35 recently addressed the problem of discrimina-
tion in tenure decisionmaking and concluded that the inherent
subjectivity of the tenure process created an irresolvable problem.
Namenwirth, the first woman hired for a tenure-track position by the
Zoology Department in thirty-five years, was also the first person denied
tenure by the Department.3 6 The Namenwirth court refused to question
the University's assessment of Namenwirth's academic potential or that
of a male candidate awarded tenure.37 The court found that its difficulty
in evaluating tenure decisions stemmed from the fact that the tenure
decisionmaker was also a source for evaluations of candidate qualifica-
tion. Thus, the court determined that attempts to "extricate discrimina-
1098 (1981); Hooker v. Tufts Univ., 581 F. Supp. 104, 112 (D. Mass. 1983) (plaintiff must be quali-
fied under the institution's standards, practices, or customs).
The Zahorik court also recognized that a plaintiff may rely on statistics in establishing her prima
facie case, although statistics may not alone prove discrimination. 729 F.2d at 95. See also Coser v.
Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 750 (2d Cir. 1984) (generalized statistical data is less persuasive when deci-
sion-making is decentralized and employer hires highly educated, specially qualified people);
Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 686 F.2d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 1982) (statistical evidence
relevant, though not necessarily sufficient in establishing prima facie case), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1173 (1983).
The court's refusal to review the merits of the tenure decision did not foreclose a plaintiff's ability
to challenge the decision. Departures from procedural regularity and conventional evidence of bias
may show that impermissible factors influenced the decision to deny tenure. 729 F.2d at 93.
35. 769 F.2d 1235, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3461 (1986).
36. Id. at 1237. In Namenwirth, the plaintiff alleged that she was denied tenure because of her
sex. The Zoology Department Salary and Promotion Committee recommended Namenwirth for
promotion, but not for tenure. The Committee questioned the strength of her research and publica-
tion record. The Zoology Department initially voted against her candidacy for tenure and after two
reconsiderations, voted 11-10 in favor of tenure. The Divisional Executive Committee, based on the
ambivalence expressed at the Department Level, voted to deny Namenwirth tenure. After some
politicking between the Department and Division, the Divisional Committee again declined to rec-
ommend Namenwirth for tenure. The Divisional Committee cited as its reasons for denial of tenure
negative reviews by the Divisional Committee and budgetary concerns.
Namenwirth alleged that the University treated her differently than a male candidate granted
tenure. The male candidate had credentials and publications similar to Namenwirth's. The Depart-
ment unanimously recommended him for tenure, but the Divisional Committee voted to deny him
tenure. Three Zoology faculty members then argued his case before the Committee. The Divisional
Committee reconsidered and recommended Dr. Moermand, the male candidate, for tenure, which
the University granted.
A magistrate compared Namenwirth's record with records of men granted tenure and found that
the University's explanation for denying Namenwirth tenure was not a pretext for sex-based discrim-
ination. The court found that the magistrate's conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1237-42.
The court also found that the selected male candidate's position as editor of a respected professional
journal could justify the differences in the Department votes. Id. at 1243.
37. Id. at 1243.
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tory motives from collegial judgments about potential and worth were
futile." 38
As a result of judicial deference to peer-review decisions, few plaintiffs
38. Id. The court stated that '[tlenure decisions have always relied primarily on judgments
about academic potential, and there is no algorithm for producing those judgments." Id.
In essence, the court held that while courts may consider the objective evidence produced in
tenure discrimination cases-such as publication and research output and outside expert evalua-
tion-ultimately the tenure decision rests on factors such as esteem and professional and personal
acceptance in the department. Esteem and acceptance derive from personal beliefs and attitudes, of
which prejudice, which may eventually be manifest as discrimination, is one of many.
Judge Swygert, in dissent, did not view winning the esteem of those colleagues whose sexual biases
are in question as dispositive. Id. at 1244. Judge Swygert saw no qualitative difference between
tenure decisions and other employment decisions. Rather, he felt that courts were better qualified to
scrutinize academic decisionmaking than that in the blue-collar context. Id. at 1244-45. He viewed
tenure decisions as capable of judicial analysis through the use of statistics, outside experts, and
other objective criteria such as number of publications. Id. at 1245. Accordingly, he found that Dr.
Moermond did not possess a superior research record justifying a different tenure decision in his
case. Id.
Although courts are unwilling to scrutinize tenure decisions, they frequently review employment
decisions in other settings. For example, courts recognize that subjective criteria often conceal dis-
crimination, particularly when objective criteria are readily available. See, e.g., Crawford v. Western
Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315-17 (5th Cir. 1980); James v. Stockham Values & Fittings Co., 559
F.2d 310, 328 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1977); United States v. Hazelwood School
Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Senter v.
General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 528-30 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
In Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972), a black employee complained
that his promotion depended upon his receiving a favorable recommendation from a white foreman.
Id. at 353. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found a violation of Title VII, noting a lack of
safeguards designed to avert discriminatory practices in the subjective promotion procedure. Id. at
358-59. The court recognized that employers may conceal discrimination in subjective evaluations.
Id. at 359. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Supreme Court criticized
subjective rating system for failure to adequately guide evaluators).
Even with respect to employment decisions that legitimately require subjective criteria, courts ask
whether the subjective criteria were a pretext for discriminatory action. See Bartholet, Application of
Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1982). Courts seem to apply differing legal
standards based on the socioeconomic status of the job involved. Systems involving blue collar jobs,
including supervisor and highly skilled craft positions, receive stricter review than those systems
involving middle and upper management jobs, professional positions, and other jobs requiring ad-
vanced educational degrees. Id. at 948 n.2.
A recent Supreme Court decision, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1985), addressed the
issue of employment discrimination in law firms. King & Spalding hired Hishon in 1972 and termi-
nated her in 1979, after deciding not to invite her into the partnership. Hishon brought a Title VII
action alleging sex discrimination in her consideration for partnership. The Court held that a prom-
ise of consideration for partnership may not be granted or withheld in a discriminatory manner. Id.
at 76.
Partnership decisions closely resemble tenure decisions. The relationship could be permanent and
will substantially affect the employer's financial condition. Employers base their assessments for
Washington University Open Scholarship
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have succeeded with claims based on allegations of discriminatory uni-
versity peer evaluations. Thus, plaintiffs have relied on evidence of past
discrimination to prove a present discriminatory intent and to prove that
facially neutral policies perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. 9 In
Jepsen v. Florida Board of Regents,4 for example, the plaintiff introduced
evidence of pre-Title VII discriminatory practices. The plaintiff claimed
that the University failed to promote her for twenty-five years, whereas
the University would have promoted an equally qualified male professor
within six years.4 The court found this evidence probative of pretext.4 2
Similarly, evidence of a university's dislike for a particular field of
study is admissible to prove that the university based a tenure denial on
impermissible criteria. Thus, in Lynn v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia,43 the plaintiff established a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
The Ninth Circuit found determinative evidence of the institution's dis-
dain for "women's issues" and a consequent low regard for faculty mem-
bers who focused on those issues.44
Courts have also based findings of unlawful discrimination on proce-
dural irregularities in the tenure decisionmaking process. In Kunda v.
Muhlenberg College,45 the College denied tenure to a female physical ed-
ucation instructor because she lacked a master's degree.46 The Third
qualification on subjective judgments of often intangible factors. The deference standard which
courts apply in tenure cases, therefore, may influence how courts will review partnership decisions.
Courts generally adopt a more lenient view of subjective criteria in managerial and professional
cases. In Grano v. Department of Dev. of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1983), the court found
that subjective employment evaluations are not illegal per se. Id. at 837. The court stated that the
ultimate issue is whether the defendant used subjective criteria to disguise discriminatory action.
The court found that the defendant's failure to promote the plaintiff, a female public relations profes-
sional, failed to constitute a Title VII violation. Id. The court noted that "the more subjective the
qualification and the manner in which it is measured, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to
meet the burden imposed by... Burdine." Id.
39. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10 n.15 (1977) (pre-act
violations relevant to show pattern of illegal conduct and purpose of motivation with regard to
independent violations occurring after effective date of Act); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d
743, 747 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir.
1980) (same).
40. 610 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1384.
43. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 1342. Lynn submitted general statistics which tended to show a pattern of discrimi-
nation by the University and specific statistical data which demonstrated that she had the same
education, experience, and number of published works as other candidates who received tenure. Id.
45. 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 535-37.
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Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that because the College advised two
male tenure candidates of the degree requirement, but failed to advise the
plaintiff, the college discriminated against her.4 7
B. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO DISCOVERY
In addition to refusing to scrutinize the substance of peer evaluations,
some courts have strictly limited the discovery of confidential peer-re-
view documents. The reluctance to permit full discovery of tenure pro-
ceedings stems from judicial recognition that confidentiality plays an
important role in preserving the integrity of the peer-review process.4a
Accordingly some courts conclude that preservation of "academic free-
dom" warrants judicial protection of peer-review materials. Courts de-
fine "academic freedom" as the ability of members of the academic
community to inquire into, experiment with and speculate about ideas
notwithstanding their general acceptability.49 Courts consider the deter-
47. Id. at 545. The court concluded that the degree requirement was not a pretextual reason
for denial of tenure. Rather, the court simply found that the college gave no legitimate reason for its
failure to counsel Kunda. Id. at 546.
48. See Hill & Hill, Employment Discrimination: A Rollback of Confidentiality in University
Tenure Procedures?, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 209, 209 (1984) ("Two values then collide: the individual's
right to an employment decision free from discriminatory motives, and an educational institution's
interest in protecting the confidentiality and integrity of peer review.").
49. Courts recognize academic freedom as the primary interest in academic Title VII cases.
See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980). The court stated:
The essence of academic freedom is the protection for both faculty and students "to in-
quire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." It is the life-
blood of any educational institution because it provides "that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation." Only when students and faculty are
free to examine all options, no matter how unpopular or unorthodox, without concern that
their careers will be indelibly marred by daring to think along nonconformist pathways,
can we hope to insure an atmosphere in which intellectual pioneers will develop. Aca-
demic freedom prevents "a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom", it fosters "that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth." Our future, not only as a nation but as a civiliza-
tion, is dependent for survival on our scholars and researchers, and the validity of their
product will be directly proportionate to the stimulation provided by an unfettered thought
process... Therefore, academic freedom, the wellspring of education, is entitled to maxi-
mum protection.
Id. at 547-48 (footnotes and citations omitted).
Commentators argue that freedom of speech and freedom of association justify a qualified privi-
lege for confidential communications in tenure decisions. Note, Academic Freedom and Federal
Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. REV. 879, 885-89 (1979). Some commentators argue
that courts should establish a qualified evidentiary privilege for universities' confidential employment
records. Smith, Protecting the Confidentiality of Faculty Peer Review Records: Department of Labor
v. University of California, 8 J. COL. & UNiv. L. 20 (1981-82); Note, Preventing Unnecessary Intru-
sions on University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1538
(1981); Evidence-Privilege-A Privilege Based on Academic Freedom Does Not Insulate A University
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mination of who is qualified to teach essential to the preservation of aca-
demic freedom.5" Courts disagree, however, about the appropriate
methods for protecting academic freedom and the peer-review process.
In Gray v. Board of Higher Education,5 the Second Circuit adopted a
qualified privilege, protecting the confidentiality of tenure committee
documents only when the institution disclosed in a written statement the
reasons for tenure denial.52 The court stated that the plaintiff must have
an opportunity to discover evidence necessary to establish a prima facie
case.53 In this sense, the court's holding is narrow. When a plaintiff
From Disclosing Confidential Employment Information (In Re Dinnan, 5th Cir. 1981), 52 Miss. L.J.
493 (1982).
50. In EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983), the Seventh
Circuit cited Justice Frankfurter's summary of the "four essential freedoms" that constitute aca-
demic freedom:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four
essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, and who may be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
Id. at 335, quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result).
The court continues:
Moreover, it is evident that confidentiality is absolutely essential to the proper function-
ing of the faculty tenure review process. The tenure review process requires that written
and oral evaluations submitted by academicians be completely candid, critical, objective
and thorough in order that the University might grant tenure only to the most qualified
candidates based on merit and ability to work effectively with colleagues, students, and the
administration. For these reasons, academicians who are selected to evaluate their peers
for tenure have, since the inception of the academic tenure concept, been assured that their
critiques and discussions will remain confidential. Without this assurance of confidential-
ity, academicians will be reluctant to offer candid and frank evaluations in the future,'
615 F.2d at 336.
51. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982).
52. Id. at 908. The court adopted the position of the American Association of University
Professors that "[i]f an unsuccessful candidate for reappointment or tenure receiving a meaningful
written statement of reasons from the peer review committee and is afforded proper intramural
grievance procedures, disclosure of individual votes should be protected by a qualified privilege." Id.
at 907.
53. Id. at 908. The plaintiff, Dr. Gray, alleged racial discrimination by LaGuardia Community
College under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985. He then sought discovery of the votes of two of the
faculty members whom he believed may have discriminated against him. The district court balanced
the plaintiff's right to discovery against society's interest in the confidentiality of the peer-review
process. The district court ultimately held that the importance of protecting the integrity of peer-
review in academia outweighed the benefit to Dr. Gray of discovery of testimony which might sup-
port his claim. 692 F.2d at 903-04. The Second Circuit reversed, approving the district court's
balancing approach but adopting a different balance.
The court in Zaustinsky v. University of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622 (N.D. Cal. 1983), applied a two-stage
discovery process for confidential materials. First, when the defendant's reasons are based on confi-
dential materials, the defendant must provide "a written statement of the reasons for defendant's
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/13
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lacks information critical to the establishment of a prima facie case, the
right to a nondiscriminatory employment decision takes precedence over
the institution's interest in academic freedom.
In EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 4 the Seventh Circuit
created a different qualified privilege. The court permitted discovery of
tenure proceedings, but allowed the University to conceal the identity of
the participants." The court allowed the EEOC to overcome this quali-
fied privilege by demonstrating a particularized need for the identity. 6
Other courts refuse to recognize any privilege, holding that an institu-
tion's interest in preserving academic freedom is less compelling than a
tenure candidate's right to nondiscriminatory evaluation. These courts
reason that Congress did not intend to bestow special Title VII treatment
on academic institutions and that a privilege against discovery would
promote discrimination. 7
decision, including a comprehensive summary in writing of the substance of confidential documents
in such records." Id. at 625. Second, when the material produced does not fully reflect the basis for
the University's action, the court must balance the relative prejudice and injury to the parties. Id. at
626.
54. 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 337-38.
56. Id. at 338. The court defined "particularized need" as a "compelling necessity for the spe-
cific information requested." Id. Mere relevance or usefulness would be insufficient to meet this
standard. Under this standard "a party's need varies in proportion to degree of access he has to
other sources of information he seeks." Id.
57. See, e.g., In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dinnan v.
Blaubergs, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). The Fifth Circuit refused to find a privilege that would allow a
professor who participated in the tenure decision to withhold disclosure of his vote in response to a
deposition question.
In EEOC v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1985), the court relied on what it
viewed as a "clear mandate" from Congress to deny privileged status to a wide range of peer review
materials, even though the court recognized that peer review may be burdened by its decision. Id. at
115. The court limited the EEOC's subpoena power to that which is relevant to the charge under
investigation. When the charge is in the investigatory stage, the court noted, relevance is construed
broadly. Id. at 116.
Chief Judge Aldisert in dissent found that Congress neither foresaw nor intended that the 1972
amendment to Title VII would permit a college instructor, merely by means of a vague allegation of
discrimination, access to the confidential personnel files of his colleagues. Id. at 119. The court's
formulation, Judge Aldisert stated, would result in a practically unlimited scope of discovery in the
administrative subpoena process. Judge Aldisert adopted a balancing approach similar to the Sec-
ond Circuit's in Gray. He proposed that the EEOC should at least be required to set forth a "justifi-
catory factual predicate for the confidentiality of privacy intrusions instead of naked conclusory
allegations." Id. at 121.
In Rollins v. Farris, 108 F.R.D. 714 (E.D. Ark. 1985), a district court adopted the holding of the
Third Circuit in Franklin & Marshall and granted the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of the
minutes of faculty committees. Id. at 1106. The court balanced the need for discovery and the
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III. COMPROMISE PROPOSALS
In response to concern about discrimination in academic employment
decisions, Congress amended Title VII to extend coverage to college-
level employment decisions. Nevertheless courts persistently refuse to
question subjective peer judgments that play an integral role in the tenure
decision process. In addition, courts are hesitant to compromise the con-
fidentiality of that process. This Note proposes two mechanisms for
courts to address fairly discrimination claims against academic institu-
tions with minimal intrusion into academic freedom.
A. Restructuring the Defendant's Burden of Proof. An Equivalence of
Probability
The McDonnell Douglas test requires that a university articulate legiti-
mate reasons for denial of tenure upon the establishment of a prima facie
case by the plaintiff.5" However, judicial deference to tenure decisions
usually precludes a plaintiff from proving pretext, and thus terminates
the inquiry into possible discrimination.59
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,6 ° the Supreme
Court limited the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a burden of pro-
duction of evidence sufficient to create an issue of fact. The Court be-
lieved that this minimal burden of production would not unduly hinder
the plaintiff's ability to prove that the defendant's reasons were a pretext
for discrimination. The justifications offered by the Court, however, un-
derscore the problems created by the minimal burden of production in
the context of tenure discrimination claims.61
First, the Burdine Court explained that the purpose of the defendant's
burden of production is solely to classify factual issues for the plaintiff's
benefit in proving pretext. Thus, the Court stated, the plaintiff must re-
ceive a "full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."' 62 The Bur-
dine articulation requirement in the tenure context, however, denies the
societal value of academic freedom. In finding that no privilege exists for academic tenure review
materials when the plaintiff must prove intent to discriminate, the court recognized that "[a]cademic
freedom in employment actions extends only insofar as legitimate, academic grounds form the basis
of tenure decisions." Id. at 1105.
58. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
60. 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 255-56.
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plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to prove pretext. This result inures
because of the well-established policy of judicial deference to the defend-
ant's articulated justifications.63 Second, the Burdine Court stated that
the articulation requirement would nonetheless encourage the defendant
to persuade the trier of fact that the employment decision was lawful. 64
Again, the policy of judicial deference in academic Title VII cases frus-
trates any incentive for a university to present persuasive evidence that
its tenure decision was nondiscriminatory.65 Continued judicial defer-
ence may in fact cause academic institutions to overlook discrimination
in the peer-review process. Ultimately, colleges and universities will be
insulated from the reach of Title VII, contrary to the clear intent of
Congress.
Finally, the Burdine Court recognized that liberal discovery under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and access to EEOC investigatory files would
assist plaintiffs in proving pretext.66 Some courts, adhering to notions of
academic freedom, however, have restricted the discovery process by cre-
ating privileges against the discovery of peer-review process materials.67
As a result, the liberal discovery envisioned by Burdine may be unavaila-
ble in the context of tenure discrimination claims.
The Supreme Court should modify the defendant's evidentiary burden
in academic Title VII cases to reestablish the plaintiff's fair opportunity
to prove discrimination. A workable solution would be to require the
defendant to establish that the non-existence of discrimination is as prob-
able as the existence of discrimination.68
63. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
64, Id.
65. A defendant academic institution, aware that the court will defer to an explanation that the
candidate's peers found the candidate's weaknesses in scholarship, teaching, or collegiality precluded
an offer of tenure, will simply present the requisite evidence to meet the Burdine standard and await
judgment in its favor. If the plaintiff makes out a particularly strong prima facie case, the university
may want to present sufficient evidence to offset the plaintiff's evidence. In either case the court's
policy of deference, rather than solely the strength of the plaintiff's evidence, will determine the
amount of evidence that the university must offer to defeat the allegation of discrimination.
66. 450 U.S. at 258.
67. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
68. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2493d. (Chadbourne rev. 1981) (defining the standard).
In Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959), a court applying
the proposed standard noted that "it seems pointless to create a presumption and endow it with
coercive force, only to allow it to vanish in the face of evidence of dubious weight or credibility." See
also Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 591, 128 P.2d 16, 19 (1942) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (suggesting
use of equivalence of probability standard). See generally MeBaine, Burden of Proof Presumptions,
I UCLA L. Rev. 13, 22-29 (1954) (discussing equivalence of probability).
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This equivalence of probability standard would force defendants to
produce evidence of good faith, providing the plaintiff with an opportu-
nity to challenge that evidence. In addition, courts would have a limited
opportunity to scrutinize the decision-making criteria employed by the
defendant, as the courts do in other contexts. Finally, an equivalence of
probability standard is consistent with Burdine's holding that the ulti-
mate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff.69
B. A Multi-Tiered Discovery Process
Courts disagree about the relative importance of a plaintiff's interest in
proving pretext versus a university's interest in maintaining the confiden-
tiality of tenure review materials.7" This Note proposes that courts
strictly regulate discovery on a case-by-case basis to minimize unneces-
sary discovery of peer evaluations, while retaining access to materials for
plaintiffs who demonstrate a specific need.71
Initially, courts should require a plaintiff to provide evidence of dis-
crimination outside the peer-review process. Once the plaintiff meets this
burden, the court may be able reliably to infer the possibility of bias
69. 450 U.S. at 247. Alternatively, application of the equivalence of probability burden need
not be limited to the unique academic Title VII cases. It may be applied to settings in which the
unique nature of the employment decisions cause courts to refrain from applying the standard of
scrutiny normally applied to Title VII suits. One potential area is law firm partnership decisions.
See supra note 38.
70. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
71. This proposal does not adopt a qualified privilege approach, but rather suggests that courts
regulate discovery in the outlined manner pursuant to the power granted them by Congress in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), which states:
(1) In General Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other
party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowlege of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to, the discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall
be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumu-
lative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii)-the discovery is un-
duly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitation on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake
in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pur-
suant to a motion under subdivision (c).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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within the confidential peer review. This initial burden preserves the
confidentiality of university files when no visible evidence exists that the
institution employed unlawful criteria in its review process.
Based on the type and weight of the plaintiff's initial evidence of dis-
crimination, the court should allow limited discovery of confidential
materials. The court should tailor the scope of discovery to conform to
the nature and weight of the plaintiff's initial evidence and the defend-
ant's articulation of justifications. For example, if the plaintiff produces
evidence that one member of the tenure committee made sexist or racist
comments about the plaintiff, then discovery of this individual's evalua-
tion should be allowed. If discovery reveals that this individual gave a
positive, nondiscriminatory evaluation, then the court should halt this
avenue of discovery. Only when selective discovery provides additional
evidence of discrimination should the court allow further discovery of
peer-review materials.72 The court in the exercise of its proposed regula-
tory control over the discovery process may require that the names of the
reviewers be excised from the discoverable materials. The court may also
use in camera review and protective orders. A carefully regulated dis-
covery process in academic Title VII cases protects the confidentiality of
university records while providing the plaintiff with a fair opportunity to
obtain documents essential to proving pretext.73
III. CONCLUSION
The courts' approach to academic employment discrimination differs
significantly from their approach to discrimination in other settings. In
academic cases, courts are unwilling to scrutinize faculty tenure deci-
sions based on highly subjective criteria and are reluctant to allow dis-
covery of confidential peer-review materials. The two changes suggested
by this Note reduce the unnecessary protection that courts presently af-
72. The court may apply differing threshold standards to civil plaintiffs and the EEOC. See
supra note 57. While a court may adopt a relevance standard for an EEOC subpoena during the
investigatory stage that is lower than that for a plaintiff in a suit in federal district court, the multi-
tiered approach would still protect confidential peer review materials from indiscriminate "fishing"
by the EEOC.
73. A university's awareness that its peer review materials were subject to full or partial discov-
ery when other evidence of discrimination exists may encourage it to demand from its faculty tenure
decisions free from unlawful bias and in addition, free from overt, detectable irregularities.
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ford academic institutions, and offer victims of academic employment
discrimination a reasonable opportunity to obtain relief.
Andrew M. Staub
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